Abstract. We consider a continuous-time principal-agent model in which the agent's effort cannot be contracted upon, and both the principal and the agent may have non-standard, cumulative prospect theory type preferences. We find that the optimal contracts are likely to be "more nonlinear" than in the standard case with concave utility preferences. In the special case when the principal is risk-neutral, we show that she will offer a contract which effectively makes the agent less risk averse in the gain domain and less risk seeking in the loss domain, in order to align the agent's risk preference better with the principal's. We also find that, for specific parameter values, the shape of our optimal contract fits empirical data well.
Introduction
In this paper we consider optimal contracting between two parties -the principal ("she") and the agent ("he") -in continuous time, when the effort of the agent cannot be contracted upon. Cvitanić, Wan and Zhang (2009) develop a theory for general concave utility functions for the two parties. Motivated by behavioral criteria, specifically that of the (cumulative) prospect theory (CPT; Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , Tversky and Kahneman (1992) ), in the present paper we go a step further and allow the principal and the agent to have non-concave, CPT type preference functions.
Our model studies the case of "hidden actions" or "moral hazard", in which the agent's control (effort) of the drift of the output process cannot be contracted upon, either because it is unobserved by the principal, and/or because it is not legally enforceable.
Hence, the contract is a function of only terminal values of the underlying output process.
The seminal paper on the continuous-time principal-agent problems is Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) . In that paper the principal and the agent have exponential utility functions and the optimal contract is linear. Their work was generalized and extended by Sung (1993, 1997) , Sung (1995 Sung ( , 1997 , Müller (1998 Müller ( , 2000 , Optimal contracting with cumulative prospect theory (CPT) preferences, and, in particular, with the agent being loss averse, has already been studied in Dittmann, Maug and Spalt (2010) . They calibrate the model to CEO compensation data and find that it explains better the observed compensation contracts than the standard utility preferences (risk aversion) model. This shows the usefulness of studying such models.
There are two main contributions of our paper. First, we show that the optimal payoff depends in a nonlinear way on the value of the output at the time of payment, and may be "more nonlinear" than with the standard, concave preferences. Second, we prove that, with a risk-neutral principal, and under some technical conditions, the optimal contract convexifies the agent's preference function if it is a classical concave utility function; and the optimal contract convexifies the agent's preference function in the gain part and concavifies it in the loss part if the agent has an S-shaped behavioral utility function.
We then study in details examples with a risk-neutral principal, and an agent who has piecewise logarithmic or power objective functions respectively. Notably, we find that the CPT preferences "increase" the nonlinearity of the optimal contract, thus providing an additional rationale for the existence of option-like contracts in practice.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 presents the general approach to solving the agent's and the principal's optimization problems. Section 4 studies the case of a risk-neutral principal. Section 5 provides detailed examples. Finally, we conclude with Section 6.
The Model
We would like to have a model for the output process X of the form dX t = u t v t dt + v t dW t
for a Brownian motion process W , where u t represents the effort of the agent, and v t is the volatility process. As is usually noted in contract theory, choosing u is equivalent to choosing a probability measure over the underlying probability space. Thus, we proceed by developing the following weak formulation of the model (see Cvitanić and Zhang 2012 for more on the weak formulation).
Let B be a standard Brownian motion under some probability space with probability measure Q, and F B = {F B t } 0≤t≤T be the filtration on [0, T ] generated by B and augmented by Q-null sets. For any F B -adapted square integrable process v, let
be the output process (e.g., in the case of a fund manager managing wealth for a client, X t is the wealth process). Then, the filtration F X generated by X, is contained in the filtration F B .
We now introduce the agent's effort process u, assumed to be a functional of B. Given u, we define
along with a new probability measure Q u by dQ u /dQ M u T . By Girsanov's Theorem, under technical conditions, B u is a Brownian motion under Q u . A well known sufficient condition is the so-called Novikov condition. We will allow only those control processes u for which B u is, in fact, a Brownian motion. We have, then
That is, the triple (X, B u , Q u ) is a weak solution to the SDE (1). The choice of u corresponds to the choice of the probability measure Q u , thus to the distribution of the process X. It is well known in the literature that this is the only way to change probability measures in Brownian models, while keeping them equivalent.
Remark 1.
(i) Even though we start with X as a martingale process under Q, it is in general not a martingale process under Q u , the relevant measures under which we will be taking expected values in our optimizations problems below.
(ii) It is also possible to work with a multi- At time T , the principal gives the agent compensation in the form of a payoff C T = I(X · ), where I :
On the other hand, for any F X T -measurable contract payoff C T , there exists some functional I such that C T = I(X · ). Thus, choosing C T is equivalent to choosing I. Note that the absolute value of v can also be observed by the principal through the quadratic variation. In this sense, if we allow v to be controlled, it would be chosen by the principal. In light of this, from now on we fix v and concentrate on the effort choice. We call C T a contract.
Given a contract C T and a function U A (·, ·) representing the agent's preferences, the agent's problem is to choose the optimal effort (control) u in order to maximize his objective
where
is the accumulated cost of the agent and E u E Q u denotes the expectation under
A contract C T is implementable if there exists an effort process u C T which maximizes the agent's utility given the contract. i.e.
The typical cases studied in the literature are the separable case with U A (x, y) = U A (x) − y, and the non-separable case with U A (x, y) = U A (x − y), where, with a slight abuse of notation, U A (·) denotes the function of one argument only.
Given a function U P (·), the principal chooses the optimal C * T to maximize her objective
under the participation constraint or individual rationality (IR) constraint
Following the convention in the principal-agent literature, we assume that if the agent is indifferent between two actions, he chooses the one that makes the principal better off. This is why u C T appears as a decision variable in the principal's problem (8) .
If u C T is unique for any given C T , then it can be removed from the set of decision variables.
3 The Agent's Problem: Separable Utility and
Quadratic Cost; CWZ (2009)
In this section we consider a particular case when the agent has separable utility U A (x, y) = U A (x) − y and the cost is a quadratic function of the effort, i.e.
g(t, x, u, v) = g(u) = ku 2 /2. for some k > 0. We also assume that v is given so that the principal just needs to choose C T . The choice of such a cost function is standard in the contract theory literature, partly for tractability reasons; see, e.g., Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) . In the context of the example of a portfolio manager, the fact that cost function g does not depend on x and v means that the cost of effort does not depend on the volatility or the size of the portfolio. This is the case solved in Cvitanić, Wan and Zhang (2009) for the case of standard utility functions. We recall the method here for the convenience of the reader, and adapt it slightly to be able to apply it to more general preferences.
Under this setting we now define the feasible sets for u and C T . Roughly speaking, all we need is sufficient integrability so that the weak formulation is meaningful.
Definition 1.
The set A 1 of admissible effort processes u is the space of F B -adapted processes u such that
Definition 2. The set A 2 of admissible contracts is the space of F X T -measurable random variables C T such that
Definition 2-(ii) is a natural condition: it requires that the agent's optimal effort process in response to a given contract is admissible. In particular, we show in 
The following theorem is a variation on a result from CWZ (2009). In that paper U A (·) is assumed to be concave, which we do not need to assume here. Moreover, our admissible sets A 1 and A 2 are somewhat different. For these reasons, we provide a proof here.
We use notation E t for conditional expectation given σ-algebra F B t .
Theorem 1.
For any contract C T ∈ A 2 , the agent's optimal effortû ∈ A 1 is obtained from solving the following BSDĒ
which has a unique F B -adapted solution (Ȳ,û). Moreover, the optimal value for the agent's problem is
Proof We first show that the BSDE (12) admits a unique solution andû ∈ A 1 . By Definition 2-(i), the following linear BSDĒ
has a unique solution (Ȳ,Z). Note thatȲ t > 0. Defineû t Z t /Ȳ t . Then (Ȳ,û) satisfies (12).
SinceȲ t > 0 is continuous and
Moreover, direct calculation yields that
which means that Mû is an F B -martingale under Q. So Girsanov's theorem holds for
the definition of A 2 implies thatû satisfies Definition 1-(iii). Thereforeû ∈ A 1 .
We now show thatû is optimal for the agent's problem. For any u ∈ A 1 , consider the remaining utility of the agent at time t 
Switching from B u to B, we have
On the other hand, from (12) , it follows
Note that W A,u
1 Due to the lack of Lipschitz continuity caused by the quadratic termû 2 t , we cannot directly apply the Comparison Theorem for BSDEs here.
The equality holds if and only if
0 , where the equality holds if and only if u =û.
solves (12), then there is a constant ǫ > 0 such that ǫ < sup 0≤t≤TȲ t < 1/ǫ and
From (12) we haveȲ t =Ȳ 0 Mû t , which, together with (13), yields
Equivalently, by taking into account the participation constraint,
for someR ≥ R. So the principal's problem becomes
For every pair (C T ,R) in whichR > R, there is a pair (C T , R) which attains a strictly higher value in the above problem.
Thus, (f (C T ), R) is strictly better than (C T ,R) in the above problem.
In the light of the above proposition, we can setR = R. Hence, the principal's problem simplifies to
Thus, in view of the Lagrange approach, we get the following
where λ ∈ R and there exists λ 0 such that
T is the optimal contract.
Optimal Contracts with Risk-Neutral Principal
In the above setting (the agent has a separable utility and a quadratic cost), we now investigate the optimal contracts with a risk-neutral principal, that is, U P (x) = x..
The latter assumption is standard in contract theory, especially in applications to corporate finance, in which it is assumed that all the shareholders of the firm hiring the agant represent the principal, and those shareholders are well-diversified in the market, hence risk-neutral with respect to one particular firm. For simplicity of notation, we set k = 1 in the rest of the paper. We study two cases for the agent's preference, one with a neoclassical (concave) utility function, and the other dictated by the cumulative prospect theory (CPT).
A main issue we address is how an optimal contract effectively changes the agent's risk preference. For this purpose we now introduce the notion of concavifying and convexifying utility function.
Let A U denote the coefficient of absolute risk aversion of a strictly increasing function U :
whereever U ′′ (x) exists and U ′ (x) = 0.
Following Ross (2004), we introduce the following definition. 
Remark 3. Note that
Thus, we deduce by Lemma 2 that f concavifies (convexifies) U if and only if the coefficient of absolute risk aversion of U • f is larger (smaller) than that of U , i.e.
We now want to solve the problem of maximizing (19) with
where we think of y as X T + λ. Then the target is to maximize F (·, y) for every y.
Clearly, the first order condition is U ′ A (c)(y − c) = 1.
Agent with Concave Utility
We first consider the simpler case with a classical utility function
is overall concave. Denote c min inf{c : U A (c) > −∞}. We assume that U A (·) is smooth on (c min , +∞) and let A(·) be the coefficient of absolute risk aversion of U A (·).
We introduce the following condition.
is a convex function with −A ′ (x)(x − β) ≤ A(x) on x > c min .
Example 2. Let c min ∈ (−∞, +∞) be given and take U A (c) = (c − c min ) γ /γ with γ < 1, γ = 0. Then
Again, U A (·) satisfies Condition 1.
Example 3. Let c min ∈ (−∞, +∞) be given and take U A (c) = − exp{−Ac}. Then
A is a constant and c min = −∞. So U A (·) does not satisfy Condition 1.
, which is assumed to be concave and smooth on (c min , +∞). Then, the equation
admits a unique rootc(y) ∈ (c min , y), ∀y > c min + 1/u ′ (c min +), and H(c, y) < 0 on
. Moreover, we have the following results.
(i) The optimal contract, if it exists, is
(iii) If Condition 1 holds, or A is a constant function, thenc(·) convexifies u(·) on (ii) By
Since A(·) > 0 and y >c(y), it follows thatc ′ (y) ∈ (0, 1).
(iii) By Lemma 2, it suffices to prove D(y) A(y) +c
Taking derivative on both sides of (26) with respect to y yields
Now suppose that Condition 1 holds. Then there exists β ≤ c min such that A(x)(x−β)
is convex on x > c min . We thus have
Therefore
Finally, if A is a constant, we have, for any y > c min + 1/u ′ (c min +),
The preceding theorem shows that the optimal contract is generally a nonlinear increasing function of the final asset value, and the marginal increasing ratec ′ (·) ∈ (0, 1), which implies that both the agent's and the principal's payoffs are strictly increasing with respect to the final asset value. We will show later that this is not the case if the agent has an S-shaped behavioral utility function. More precisely, in some domains the marginal increasing rate of the optimal contract can be larger than 1; see also Remark 5 below.
Agent with S-shaped utility
In this subsection we consider the case where the agent has behavioral preferences.
More precisely, we use an S-shaped utility U A (·) for the agent's risk preference, with a reference point K, as defined next.
An S-shaped utility U A (·) with reference point K is defined by
where K ≥ 0 is a constant, u + (·) and u − (·) : Let A be the coefficient of absolute risk aversion of U A , which is defined except at x = K. Introduce the following conditions, needed to insure the existence of the optimal solution in the principal's problem: 
where θ > 1 (implying loss aversion), K > 0 and 0 < γ < 1 are constants. Then
Therefore the S-shaped piecewise power utility defined above satisfies Condition 2.
We will revisit this example in Subsection 5.2.
Remark 4. One can check that an S-shaped piecewise logarithmic utility also satisfies Condition 2. However, an S-shaped piecewise exponential utility, whose A(·) is a negative constant on (−∞, K), does not satisfy Condition 2-A3.
That is,
Note that H(c, y) is only defined on c > K and L(c, y) is only defined on c < K.
Lemma 3. Let u(·) be the gain part of U A (·), i.e. u(·) is defined on [K, +∞) and
admits a unique rootc(y) ∈ (K, y), ∀y > K + 1/u ′ (K+), and H(c, y) < 0 on
Moreover, in the case y > K + 1/u ′ (K+), we further have the following results:
(i)c(y) = arg max c≥K F (c, y).
(ii)c ′ (y) ∈ (0, 1).
Proof It can be proved exactly the same as Theorem 3. (ii) c ′ (y) ∈ (1, +∞), ∀y < K. − A(c(y))c ′ (y) ≤ 0 ∀y < K. Taking derivative on both sides of (36) in y yields
Now suppose that Condition 2.-A2 holds. Then there exists η ≥ K such that A(x)(η− x) is concave on x < K. We thus have
Now fix λ and denote Y T X T + λ. Suppose that there is a deterministic function 
Since L(c, y) and F c (c, y) have the same sign on (−∞, K) × R, we conclude that
We summarize the above results in the following theorem. (ii) For
(iii) There exists some
(v) For y ≥ K, there exists some c 0 < K such that C * T (y) ≥ c 0 .
Proof These results follow from Lemma 3, Lemma 4 and Lemma 5.
Remark 5. When the final output is sufficiently low so that y < K (and therefore C * T (y) = c(y)), by Lemma 4 the marginal increasing rate of the optimal compensation with respect to the final asset value is greater than 1, which means that the marginal increasing rate of the principal's payoff, X T − C * T , is negative. This result is specific to the S-shaped behavioral utilities. Due to the convexity of the loss part of the S-shaped utility, c ′ > 1 is the most efficient way to meet the participation constraint.
In the case of standard preferences the marginal increasing rate of the compensation is between 0 and 1, and the principal's and the agent's payoffs are both increasing with respect to the asset value, as is the case in Theorem 3 for the classical utilities and in Theorem 4 when C * T (y) =c(y). Nevertheless, not unlike the standard case, both c(·) andc(·) are increasing functions, thus providing incentives for the agent to favor higher outcome of the asset value. Proof These follow from Lemmas 3 and 4.
Remark 6. By Theorem 5, an optimal contract convexifies the agent's utility on the gain part where the agent is risk averse, and concavifies the utility on the loss part where the agent is risk seeking. Since the principal is risk-neutral, the optimal contract helps to align the agent's risk preference with the principal's.
Denote by C λ T the maximizer of (19) and S(λ) E e In particular, if we assume that S(·) is continuous 2 , then there exists λ 0 such that S(λ 0 ) = e R for any arbitrarily given R ∈ R.
Proof Denote Y 
Comparison with First-Best Contracts
In the so-called first-best case in a principal-agent problem, the principal can contract upon the agent actions, therefore can optimally choose the action to maximize her objective function. The principal's problem is defined as, upon introducing a Lagrangian multiplier λ,
Later we show in Section 5.1 that the corresponding S(·) is continuous.
= max
Given λ ≥ 0, the first best-optimal contract is determined as
which is a constant (if it exists) and, notably, independent of X T . This is a standard result, driven by the fact that the risk-neutral principal does not mind taking all the risk, and, because the principal chooses the actions, she does not have to provide incentives (related to the final output) to the agent. In contrast, we have seen in the previous sections that the optimal contracts with moral hazard are (non-constant) functions of X T . Thus, the value function of the principal is strictly less in the second-best, moral hazard case than in the first-best case. As an extreme example, CWZ (2009) show that if dX t = X t (u t dt + σ t dB t ), σ t > 0 is deterministic and there exists ǫ > 0 such that ǫ < σ t < 1 ǫ , then the principal's first-best optimal utility is +∞ (i.e., the principal's problem is ill-posed). This can also be shown here when the agent has an S-shaped utility as in the above examples.
Risk-Averse Principal
The assumption that the principal is risk-neutral is standard in contract theory, because in the main applications the principal is an institution represented by many members, such as shareholders of a company, who are likely to have well-diversified portfolio of assets in the outside market, and are thus not risk-averse with respect to the performance of this particular institution. Nevertheless, it might be of interest to consider the case of a risk-averse principal; so we briefly discuss the case when U P is not linear.
When we have enough smoothness, the first order condition for optimal C T for the optimization problem in Theorem 2 is of the form
and thus the optimal contract is still a function c(X T ) of the terminal value X T only.
Using this equation we can find the sensitivity c ′ (x) of the optimal contract with respect to the output, omitting the functions arguments:
We see from here that the difference between the risk-neutral case and the risk-averse case is the term
A , which is zero in the risk-neutral case. With U A increasing, if we assume that U P is a standard utility function, increasing and strictly concave, then that term is negative. Thus, in the concave domain in which U ′′ A (x) < 0, we have c ′ (x) < 1; but c ′ (x) is likely to be closer to one than when the principal is risk-neutral. 3 This means that, in the region in which the agent is risk-averse, the more risk-averse principal (higher risk aversion
) is likely to transfer more risk to the agent, which is not surprising. In the agent's risk-seeking domain in which To summarize, in both cases, the risk-averse principal chooses c ′ (x) closer to one than the risk-neutral principal. Taking this to extreme, the infinitely risk-averse principal would simply sell the whole firm to the agent (c ′ (x) = 1), a standard result from the classical contract theory.
Randomization under S-Shaped Utility
When the agent preference is behavioral with an S-shaped utility function, he is riskseeking in the loss part of the domain of his utility function. It therefore may be advantageous for the principal to introduce randomized contracts in order to benefit from the agent's willingness to engage in some gambles. In this section we show that, indeed, randomization may strictly Pareto improve the contract. However, we are unable to find the optimal randomized contract, a task which appears to be a very hard mathematical problem, and is thus left for future study.
Consider a σ-field G T independent of F X T , and the σ-field H T generated by G T and F X T . We consider the same setting as in Section 3 except that now admissible contracts are allowed to be H T -measurable. In other words, in addition to F X T -measurable contracts in the original problem, the principal may randomize such contracts based on an independent random source corresponding to G T .
Assume that the principal is risk-neutral, i.e., U P (x) = x. Applying the same arguments leading to problem (18) , that is, going through the proof of Theorem 1, it can be verified that the problem now becomes
where the maximization is taken over contracts C T that are H T -measurable. Clearly, when no randomization is applied then (40) reduces to (18) (where U P (x) = x).
Let U A be an S-shaped utility function such that U A (c) is strictly concave for c > K and strictly convex for c ≤ K where K is the reference point. Let C T be a (nonrandomized) contract which is F X T -measurable, andC T be a randomization of C T , namely, a H T -measurable random variable such that E(C T |F X T ) = C T . We then construct another randomization of C T only on C T ≤ K:
We now show that such a randomized contract is Pareto improving if C T ≤ X T (so that the principal gets a non-negative payoff). 4 Clearly,C T is H T -measurable, and
Thus, we also have X T ≥ E(C T |F X T ) and
where the inequality is due to the convexity of U A (c) on c ≤ K and Jensen's inequality.
On the other hand,
Combining the above, we conclude J(C T ) ≥ J(C T ). Moreover, by the same argument 4 For some parameter configurations the optimal non-randomized contract C * T satisfies C * T ≤ X T , so that its randomizationC * T will be preferable to all non-randomized contracts; see Proposition 3 below for some cases under which C * T ≤ X T .
we derive
Thus, if P (C T ≤ K) > 0 then due to the strict convexity of U A on c ≤ K the preceding inequality is equality if and only if E(C T |F X T ) =C T , that is, ifC T = C T . This shows that, for any contract that pays the agent in the loss domain with a positive probability and in that domain his utility is strictly convex, the above randomization will strictly increase the agent's utility while not reducing the principal's utility. This is to be contrasted to the static setting of DMS (2010) in which they assume that there is a lower bound on the contract payoff and the randomization is not optimal 5 .
Examples
In this section, we apply the general theory established in the previous section to specific examples and obtain more concrete and complete results. As before the principal is risk-neutral. The agent's preferences are taken to be the standard preferences from the behavioral literature, that is, log, power and exponential S-shaped preferences, with a kink at the inflection point.
Piecewise Logarithmic Utility
Consider the agent's preferences given by
where θ > 1 (representing loss-aversion) and K > 0 (reference point) are constants.
Here U A (·) is convex on c < K, reflecting a risk-seeking attitude on losses.
By Lemma To summarize, we obtain the optimal C * T as follows
where 
Since f ′ > 0, A U A •f and A U A have the same sign for y > K + 1 and y < K, which means that U A • f is still concave on y > K + 1 and convex on y < K. In other words, f (·) convexifies U A (·) for y > K + 1 but keeps its concavity; f (·)
concavifies U A (·) for y < K but keeps its convexity. The contract f (·) makes U A (·) in parts less concave and in parts less convex to align better with the principal's risk neutrality.
(ii) For K < y < K + 1/θ, U A is concave while U A • f is convex. Thus, f (·) heavily convexifies U A (·) in order to keep U A • f better aligned with the risk neutrality.
Finally, for y ∈ [K + 1/θ, K + 1], the optimal compensation is a constant K.
In what follows we consider the optimal contract as a function of X T rather than
Let α 0 K + 1 − λ 0 where λ 0 is the Lagrangian multiplier that satisfies the participation constraint. 
+K.
Proof The first claim follows from (43). By (43), we also have
, from which the second claim follows.
Thus, even when the final outcome to be shared is non-negative, X T ≥ 0, the principal or the agent may have negative payoffs. However, it is impossible that both the principal and the agent receive negative payoffs simultaneously. The probabilities of receiving negative payoffs depend on the value of α 0 .
We now show whether and how the contract g(·) in (43) convexifies or concavifies the agent's utility function. A direct computation yields
which is in the loss domain (C * T < K). In addition, if α 0 ≤ K + 1, then the optimal contract convexifies U A (·) on {X T > α 0 ∨K}, which is in the gain domain (44) and Lemma 2, the conclusions follow.
Remark 9. From (43) we see that, when α 0 < X T < K, the optimal contract maps the asset value below the reference point (X T < K) to a compensation above
Since the utility is S-shaped, the contract concavifies the utility by effectively changing risk-seeking into risk-aversion. For K < X T < α 0 − (θ − 1)/θ, the situation is opposite, that is, the contract maps the asset value above the reference point to a compensation below it, convexifying the utility by converting risk-aversion into risk-seeking. On the other hand, if
or α 0 ∈ [K, K + (θ − 1)/θ], then (43) implies that the principal pays the agent more than K only when the outcome of the managed asset exceeds α 0 , which is above K, and pays him less than K only if the outcome falls below a threshold α 0 − (θ − 1)/θ, which is below K.
Piecewise Power Utility
In this subsection we study the case where the agent has a piecewise power, S-shaped utility function.
Example 5. (Piecewise power, S-shaped) Take
where θ > 1, K > 0 and 0 < γ < 1 are constants.
The functions H and L defined in (32) and (33) read
Lemma 6. For y ∈ (K, K + δ), L(c, y) = 0 admits two roots c A (y) < c P (y) < K.
Note j(·, y) is strictly increasing, j(K−, y) = +∞ and j(−∞, y) < 0. Therefore L(·, y) attains its minimum at c 0 (y) < K such that j(c 0 (y), y) = 0, i.e. Next, define the function B by
admits a unique root, denoted by c(K). Taking into account that H(c, K) < 0, we Remark 10. Here, we obtain the same qualitative result as that with the piecewise log utility in the previous example, i.e. the optimal contract induces the agent to be less risk averse in the gain part and less risk seeking in the loss part (see Remark 3).
However, unlike in the previous example, the optimal contract here is not piecewise linear; indeed it is "more nonlinear".
Recall from Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 that 0 <c ′ (y) < 1, ∀y > K and c ′ (y) > 1, ∀y < K. The following proposition investigatesc ′′ (y) and c ′′ (y). higher and possibly converts the concavity into convexity if the relative risk aversion is lower. Figure 1 shows the effective concavifying/convexifying of the agent's utility function byc(·) and c(·). In Figure 2 , the contract function is plotted. The dotted line is linear, comparing to which we see that c(·) is convex, while the dashed line is the identity function, comparing to which we see that c ′ (·) > 1 in the loss part.
Suppose a function T (·) satisfies U A (c(y)) = T (U A (y)) (recall Definition 3). The function T (·) should be convex on the gain part and concave on the loss part. In Figure   3 the dashed lined is linear, compared to which we see the convexity or concavity of T.
Conclusions
We find the optimal contracts that the principal should pay to the agent who applies effort to the output process, in the moral hazard framework in which they may have prospect theory type preferences. In particular, we discuss in details the opti- mal contracts when the principal is risk-neutral while the agent has a non-standard, behavioral preference function. We find that the contracts are likely to be more nonlinear with those preferences. It would be of interest to extend this analysis to the case of a continuous stream of compensation payments, as is done in Sannikov (2008) for the case of an agent with standard preferences. Moreover, in this paper we only consider non-randomized contracts, and leave the hard problem of finding the optimal randomized contract for future research.
